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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2931 
___________ 
 
BRUCE KLASTOW, 
    Appellant 
v. 
 
NEWTOWN FRIENDS SCHOOL 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:10-cv-06079) 
District Judge:  Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 14, 2013 
Before:  FUENTES, VANASKIE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 15, 2013 ) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Bruce Klastow, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting the Newtown Friends 
School’s (“the School”) motion for summary judgment.  For the following reasons, we 
will affirm. 
I. 
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In 1979, the School hired Klastow, born in 1949, as a part-time physical education 
teacher.  By the 2008-2009 school year, Klastow was working at the School as a full-time 
history and mathematics teacher pursuant to a year-to-year contract that was terminable at 
will.  Klastow reported to Jody Smith, the head of the Upper School. 
 In June 2008, the School’s business manager, Alice Gens, discovered that Klastow 
was using the School’s credit card to purchase personal items.  Klastow told Gens that he 
used the School’s card because he did not have his personal credit card with him, and he 
understood not to use the School’s card for personal items in the future.  However, in 
September 2008, Gens spoke to Klastow again about additional personal charges that she 
did not expect to be on the billing statement.  Klastow reimbursed the School for the 
personal expenses; however, he was informed by Steven Nierenberg, the head of the 
School, that any additional personal use of the School’s card would result in termination. 
 During his employment at the School, Klastow developed a personal relationship 
with Marion Smith, a fourth-grade teacher.  Around August 2008, the School placed 
Smith in a professional development and assistance program called the Teacher 
Assistance Track (“TAT”).  In March 2009, the School terminated Smith for the reasons 
she had been placed on the TAT. 
 Also in March 2009, Gens learned of a discrepancy in expenses and funds for the 
School’s ski club, for which Klastow was a coordinator.  As a coordinator, Klastow 
collected checks and cash from students and parents to fund trips and delivered the funds 
to the school’s bookkeeper.  Klastow brought Gens an envelope with checks, but the 
checks were insufficient to cover the club’s expenses.  After numerous requests from 
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Gens, Klastow gave her an envelope of cash with students’ names written on the outside 
of the envelope.  However, the cash was insufficient to cover the club’s costs.  
Nierenberg determined that Klastow would not handle the club’s funds anymore. 
 On April 22, 2009, Klastow made a speech concerning both the leadership and 
changes occurring at the School at the School’s Meeting for Worship.1  A short time 
later, Klastow met with Jody Smith and Nierenberg to discuss the speech, and Nierenberg 
placed Klastow on paid leave for the remainder of the school year and rescinded his 
contract for the 2009-2010 school year. 
 Klastow filed his complaint pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (“ADEA”) of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623, on November 8, 2010, alleging discrimination 
and retaliation.  On November 21, 2011, the School filed a motion for summary 
judgment, to which Klastow responded.  On June 7, 2012, the District Court granted the 
School’s motion for summary judgment.  Klastow then timely filed this appeal. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s order granting summary judgment.  See Giles v. Kearney, 571 
F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009).  Summary judgment is appropriate only when the record 
“shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  “The moving party has the 
burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and 
                                              
1
 A Meeting for Worship is a weekly gathering of Quakers and members of the 
community where individuals are encouraged to stand up and speak about issues the 
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summary judgment is to be entered if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder 
could find only for the moving party.”  Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851, 854 
(3d Cir. 2000) (citing Anderson  v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). 
III. 
 On appeal, Klastow alleges that the District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment to the School because (1) his pleadings and evidence demonstrate the existence 
of genuine issues of material fact as to whether the School unlawfully discriminated 
against him; and (2) the District Court improperly favored the School’s version of the 
facts while failing to view all facts and inferences in a light most favorable to him. 
IV. 
A. ADEA Retaliation Claim 
 Klastow’s claim of retaliation is governed by the burden-shifting framework set 
forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  Namely, he must 
demonstrate: (1) that he engaged in a protected activity; (2) that he was subject to adverse 
action by the employer either subsequent to or contemporaneous with the protected 
activity; and (3) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the 
adverse action.  Fasold v. Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 188 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that in the 
absence of direct evidence of retaliation, retaliation claims under the ADEA ordinarily 
proceed under the McDonnell Douglas framework). 
 We agree with the District Court that Klastow has provided no evidence that he 
engaged in protected activity.  Under the ADEA, an employee engages in protected 
                                                                                                                                                  
community faces. 
 5 
 
activity by either opposing unlawful age discrimination or participating in proceedings 
relating to unlawful discrimination.  29 U.S.C. § 623(d).  Under the opposition clause, 
Klastow must demonstrate that he “hold[s] an objectively reasonable belief, in good 
faith,” that the activity he opposes is unlawful under the ADEA.  Moore v. City of Phila., 
461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006) (interpreting Title VII’s similar retaliation clause). 
 There is no evidence that Klastow specifically complained about age 
discrimination before he was terminated.  First, although Klastow testified that he may 
have discussed his belief that the TAT was being used to target older teachers, the 
District Court correctly noted that even after considering the evidence in Klastow’s favor, 
nothing in the record supports his statement.  Instead, the evidence indicates that Klastow 
was unhappy with the placement of certain teachers on the TAT.  Second, Klastow 
alleges that he opposed age discrimination by attending “low morale” meetings; however, 
these meetings and any subsequent communication to administrators never concerned age 
discrimination.   
Thirdly, Klastow asserts that he engaged in protected activity by writing a letter to 
Ann Reece, the clerk of the School Committee, but this letter not once mentioned age or 
any other type of discrimination.  See Barber v. CSX Distribution Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 
701 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that a letter complaining of “unfair treatment in general,” but 
not specifically complaining about age discrimination, was not protected activity for a 
prima facie ADEA retaliation case).  Finally, although Klastow asserts that he spoke out 
against discrimination at the School’s April 22, 2009 Meeting for Worship, his remarks 
concerning the School’s leadership never once referred to unlawful age discrimination.  
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Therefore, the District Court properly granted summary judgment to the School on 
Klastow’s retaliation claim because of his failure to demonstrate that he engaged in 
activity protected under the ADEA. 
B. ADEA Discrimination Claim 
 Klastow’s discrimination claim is also governed by the McDonnell Douglas 
burden-shifting framework.  Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 689 (3d Cir. 
2009).  If a plaintiff alleges unlawful termination because of age, “the prima facie case 
requires proof that (i) the plaintiff was a member of the protected class, i.e., was 40 years 
of age or older, (ii) that the plaintiff was discharged, (iii) that the plaintiff was qualified 
for the job, and (iv) that the plaintiff was replaced by a sufficiently younger person to 
create an inference of job discrimination.”  Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 
1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc) (citations omitted).  Once a plaintiff makes out a 
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant “who must then offer evidence that is 
sufficient, if believed, to support a finding that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for the discharge.”  Id.   
If the defendant satisfies that burden, the plaintiff can only overcome summary 
judgment with evidence “that the employer’s proffered rationale was a pretext for age 
discrimination.”  Smith, 589 F.3d at 690.  To show pretext, a plaintiff must submit 
evidence that: (1) casts doubt on the legitimate reason proffered by the employer so that a 
factfinder could reasonably conclude that the reason was a fabrication; or (2) allow the 
factfinder to infer that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or 
determinative cause for termination.  See Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 
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1994).  “The non-moving plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, 
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered reasons for 
its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence, 
and hence infer that the employer did not act for [the asserted] non-discriminatory 
reasons.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
We agree with the District Court that, even assuming Klastow has sufficiently 
alleged a prima facie case of unlawful age discrimination, he has failed to show that the 
School’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating him were pretextual.  In 
response to Klastow’s allegations, the School proffered the following three reasons for 
his termination: (1) his misuse of his employee credit card during the summer of 2008; 
(2) his mishandling of funds for a school ski trip in March 2009; and (3) his comments 
during the April 22, 2009 Meeting for Worship.  The School therefore articulated 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Klastow’s termination.  See Tomasso v. Boeing 
Co., 445 F.3d 702, 706 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that the employer’s burden of production at 
this stage is “relatively light, and the employer need only introduce evidence which, 
taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for 
the unfavorable employment decision” (internal citations omitted)). 
Klastow first alleges that the first reason given by the School, his improper use of 
the School’s credit card, is pretextual because of Alice Gens’ “shifting accounts” of what 
occurred with regards to his use of the card.  Gens testified before the Pennsylvania 
Unemployment Compensation Board (“the Board”) that Klastow had called the School 
over the summer to let the bookkeeper know that he had used the School’s credit card to 
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pay for an emergency car rental and that Klastow later paid for that charge by check.  
During her deposition, Gens testified that she was unable to contact Klastow over the 
summer when additional charges beyond those he had advised her of appeared in the July 
and August billing statements.  However, we agree that Gens’ testimony was not 
contradictory, as she was only asked about Klastow’s rental car charge during the Board 
hearing and was not asked about the additional charges for gas and a restaurant.  At both 
times, Gens established that Klastow had repeatedly misused the School’s credit card for 
personal charges; accordingly, Klastow has not demonstrated that this reason for his 
termination is pretextual. 
Klastow next alleges that the second reason, his mishandling of the funds relating 
to ski trips, is pretextual because Gens changed her testimony “considerably” during her 
deposition.  During the Board hearing, Gens testified that when Klastow eventually gave 
her the cash, it appeared that what she had been given was sufficient to cover costs, but 
that it was difficult to tell because of insufficient record-keeping.  At her deposition, Gens 
testified that Klastow brought her an envelope with checks, but the checks were 
insufficient to cover expenses.  Gens requested that Klastow provide her with a list of 
students from whom he had collected money.  Klastow eventually gave her an envelope 
of cash on which a “fairly illegible” list of students’ names and amounts paid had been 
written.  However, the amount of cash and checks was still insufficient to cover expenses.  
Again, we agree with the District Court that Gens’ testimony is not contradictory because 
her statement that “it appeared” that Klastow had given her sufficient funds was not a 
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definitive answer.  Accordingly, the District Court properly determined that Klastow did 
not demonstrate that this reason for his termination was pretextual. 
Thirdly, the School terminated Klastow because of the speech he gave at the April 
22, 2009 Meeting for Worship.  Klastow asserts that this reason is pretextual because he 
successfully taught for three weeks following the incident before the School terminated 
his employment.  However, during that time, several faculty members signed a letter 
expressing a belief that Klastow’s speech showed disrespect for Nierenberg and a lack of 
respect for students and staff.  Overall, the record demonstrates that Klastow was 
ultimately terminated because of his past conduct outside of the classroom, and the fact 
that he successfully taught for three weeks after the Meeting does not support a finding 
that the School’s third reason for termination was implausible.2 
Finally, Klastow attempts to discredit the School’s reasons through direct and 
circumstantial evidence that he believes demonstrates that the School unlawfully 
discriminated against him because of age.  First, while he asserts that the school used the 
TAT to unlawfully terminate older teachers like Marion Smith, he acknowledges that he 
was not on the TAT at the time of his termination, and we agree that such speculation that 
he would be the next “victim” is insufficient to show that the School’s reasons given for 
termination were pretextual.  Second, Klastow alleges that Nierenberg confirmed that the 
                                              
2
 With regards to the School’s first two reasons for termination, Klastow also argued that 
his one-year teaching contract was renewed for 2009-2010 even after these incidents.  
However, these incidents, combined with Klastow’s speech at the April 22, 2009 Meeting 
for Worship, created a history of conduct supporting Klastow’s termination.  
Accordingly, the fact that he was offered a new contract after his misuse of the School’s 
credit card and his mishandling of the ski club’s funds does not discredit the School’s 
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School engaged in unlawful age discrimination when he testified that he looked for 
“energetic dynamic go-getter[s] and individuals who would engage students rather than 
just stand up and lecture to them” when making hiring decisions.  According to Klastow, 
these statements are “loaded and coded terms” for age discrimination.  We cannot agree, 
as a reasonable inference that the School engaged in age discrimination when making 
hiring decisions cannot be made from these statements.  Finally, nothing in the letter 
Klastow received from Jody Smith denying his request for a stipend to attend a 
technology seminar can reasonably be construed as relating to age and age 
discrimination; after all, Smith encouraged Klastow to submit an amended proposal 
relating to a specific topic that he taught.  Accordingly, the District Court correctly 
determined that this evidence does not overcome the legitimate reasons given by the 
School for Klastow’s termination.3 
V. 
Overall, Klastow believes that the District Court disregarded evidence and failed 
to construe the record in his favor by ignoring his conflicting testimony.  However, as 
discussed above, the District Court did view the record in Klastow’s favor and properly 
determined that no evidence could reasonably be interpreted to demonstrate that the 
                                                                                                                                                  
reasons for termination. 
3
 Klastow also points to an annual report written by Dana Harrison, Nierenberg’s 
successor, about one year after his termination, in which Harris stated that the School has 
brought “youthful . . . professionals to reach and teach our students.”  We agree with the 
District Court that this report is not relevant because it was given one year after 
Klastow’s termination.  Furthermore, although the report references “youthful” 
professionals, it does not reasonably support an inference that Klastow was terminated 
because of unlawful age discrimination when considered together with the entire record. 
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School engaged in unlawful age discrimination or retaliation when it terminated his 
employment.  For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order 
granting the School’s motion for summary judgment. 
